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Summary 
Central to this paper is an examination of a possibly declining latitude for expressing 
(loyal) contradiction to the (political and administrative) leadership and colleagues 
through ex ante voice within public organisations. Loyal contradiction is seen here in 
relation to the appraisal role of the civil service. First a conceptual analysis is provided 
regarding key concepts as loyal contradiction, appraisal and (ex ante) voice. For our 
analysis, we have introduced a triple distinction in types of obstacles to loyal contra-
diction:  civil servants being not allowed, being not willing and not being able to pro-
vide contradiction. Loyal contradiction is not only addressed to the political and bu-
reaucratic leadership but also to the fellow workers.   
In addition, we have looked into explanatory factors causing that potential limited 
(and decreasing) scope. Besides personal characteristics of actors involved, reasons are 
found in pressures leading to short term decision making. The emergence of an ena-
bling state, the effects of new public management practises, societal pressures and me-
diacratization are a few of the main causes.   
As loyal contradiction is essential for maintaining organizational performance and le-
gitimacy, a declining scope will in the end be self-defeating to management and poli-
tics alike. By looking into the mechanisms that determines (stimulates and limits) this 
scope for loyal contradiction in organizations through voice we might also provide in-
sights how to guarantee this, what we consider, essential civil service function and ob-
ligation. 
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Prologue 
 A classic example of the importance of (loyal) contradiction often utilized in our edu-
cational programs can be found in the Challenger disaster on January 28, 1986. The 
space shuttle Challenger exploded merely 73 seconds after its launch with disastrous 
personal and organizational consequences. On closer inspection, it transpired that 
leaking rubber rings were the main cause of the disaster. A technician who had report-
ed that this problem could occur had to suppress this information.  Within the NASA 
leadership, urgency was felt to deliver and satisfy the demands of budgetary sponsors. 
Subsequently, the launch could not be postponed. The decision-making process round 
the Challenger disaster is considered a classic example of groupthink and the absence 
of organizational learning (see Janis 1972; ‘t Hart 1990).  
Later on February 1 2003, a fatal accident did occur with the space shuttle Columbia. 
Also in this particular case technicians were pressurized by management not to report 
on prevailing problems. In both cases, NASA technicians were aware that fundamental 
problems were present. These technicians were to some extent also prepared to com-
municate this information by voicing a contradiction to the NASA managerial point of 
views. Nevertheless it was not appreciated and these contradictory opinions were sup-
pressed. The technicians could choose between exit, voice and loyalty options, but they 
picked loyalty with its detrimental consequences.  
This dilemma is widespread in public administration and provides the context of this 
paper. We will examine  a (possible declining) opportunity for (loyal) contradiction 
(including appraisal) through voice within public organisations. We will have a look at 
explanatory factors behind that limited (and decreasing) scope.  As loyal contradiction 
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is considered essential for maintaining organizational performance and legitimacy, a 
declining scope will be self-defeating to management and politics alike.  
 
Introduction 
The role and position of public servants within the political administrative system and 
society at large have been defining topics within public administration (Raadschelders 
2003). Training and educating civil servants has even been a driving force in establish-
ing such a field of study in various state systems (Van der Meer, Dijkstra & Kerkhoff 
2016). For reasons of expediency in this research, the term public servant is considered 
to be equal to the civil servant concept as used in civil service system research (Bekke, 
Perry & Toonen 1993; 1996).   
The importance of civil servants in public service delivery has been argued over again 
by practioners and in academia (Weber 1976 (1921), Van Poelje 1933, Rose 1984), Van 
der Meer, Raadschelders & Toonen 2015). In the past decades, emphasis has been put 
on fundamental changes in civil service systems as a result of apparent fundamental 
transformations in the system of governance. This transformation has become appar-
ent in a multilevel character and the rise of the enabling state as will be discussed be-
low. In some branches of organizational and public management literature, the posi-
tion of bureaucracy as a fundamental carrier and embodiment of government is said to 
have come under pressure given the shift from government to governance (see our dis-
cussion in the next paragraph). At the same time more is expected of the involvement 
and input of an empowered, proactive and professional civil service from a governance 
system wide perspective (Van der Meer, Van den Berg & Dijkstra 2012). Below, we will 
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go into this paradox more in depth. Ironically given the need for a more proactive ser-
vice the actual room for manoeuvre and voice of civil servants is said to have come un-
der severe pressure related to political-administrative strains and societal performance 
requirements.  This pressure would both discourage and severely limit the actual scope 
for civil servants of articulating their professional opinions through loyal contradiction 
appraisal and voice. Relatedly, it would have stimulated the emergence of an obliging 
can-do civil servant obedient to their political and/or bureaucratic masters.1 In this 
paper, we will examine these issues by focusing on the following questions: 
‘What is the scope for loyal contradiction (including appraisal) through ex ante voice 
towards the political and organizational leadership of and colleagues within civil ser-
vice systems? What can explain potential problems obstructing the expression of these 
professional opinions? Finally, has a change occurred in terms of a decline of space 
available when comparing the present situation to the recent past and what can help 
us to explain such a possible trend?  
If a decline has become more apparent over the last decades, we have to look into rele-
vant explanations. We will do so below by pointing to and examining internal and ex-
ternal political-administrative and societal changes. Some cautionary remarks are in 
place. These concern potential difficulties regarding the availability of empirical mate-
rial in the past and possible pitfalls with respect to issues of historical accurate and 
non-anachronistic interpretations when endeavoring on a comparative historical anal-
ysis. We will start our analysis from the perspective of Western countries taking varia-
tions in political administrative models into consideration. We will make observations 
                                                          
1
 This rather has the appearance of the return of a rather primitive version of the formal-legal 
model as formulated by B. Guy Peters or Model I of Aberbach, Putnam and Rockham. 
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to what extent this issue is culturally defined and briefly extend it to ‘so-called non-
western’ environments.  
For answering our research questions, we will address the following topics. First, we 
will start with providing the context of our research: the rise of the enabling state 
against the background of a multilevel governance system and study its consequences 
for the position of public officials. Then we will present a conceptual analysis of what is 
understood by the terms voice, appraisal and loyal contradiction in the context of this 
paper. Loyal contradiction might be viewed as an awkward contradiction in terms. Be-
sides examining the role of and limits to contradiction within the civil service, we will 
discuss the issue of being loyal to and contradicting whom? Relevant forums involve 
the relevant political office holders, political institutions, the bureaucratic work envi-
ronment (superiors and colleagues) and last but not least society.  Having presented 
this framework, we will provide some answer to the questions raised above. 
 
Defining the Context: The Rise of Multilevel Governance and the Enabling State and in 
Relation to the Position of Public Officials 
In our introduction we have referred to fundamental changes in the system in govern-
ance in recent decades with the necessary consequences for and thus providing the 
context of the (changing) role and position of the civil service within that framework. 
There are two concepts that are of significance in this context. The first is a transition 
from a government centered form to a multilevel form of governance (MLG) (Peters & 
Pierre 1998; Bellamy & Palumbo 2010; Rhodes (1996; 1997) and related to that the rise 
of an enabling framework state (Raadschelders, Van der Meer & Toonen 2007). These 
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interrelated developments have had major implications for governments and the de-
mands made to their civil service systems. Elements of multi-level governance ar-
rangement governing the public domain through a network of public and private or-
ganizations on various levels of scale can historically be found in a varying degree and 
form in most countries (Van der Meer 2012). Nevertheless the fundamental change has 
been a decrease in emphasis on the dominance of government actors particularly at 
the central level and increasing relevance of decentralized, international and foremost 
private actors working together in a network setting. That coincided with a changing 
role for government(s) becoming manifest in the rise of an enabling framework state.  
The idea behind the enabling state concept is that governments should concentrate on 
creating and supplying necessary good conditions for citizens, civil society and market 
parties. So, the latter can take care of their own and communal interests2 (see also Page 
& Wright 2007; Van der Meer 2009). The emphasis on the relationship with the private 
segments of the public domain underlines the multilevel governance context. Those 
enabling conditions are often conveyed through the concepts of good governance and 
institutional capacity (Van der Meer 2009; 2012). The role, tasks, attitude and position 
of civil servants within public governance would have developed towards a facilitating 
and an intermediary role between the political and administrative divisions of govern-
ment and even more crucially between government and society (Raadschelders & Van 
der Meer 2007, Van der Meer 2012, and Page & Wright 2009).3 That new role would 
require an enhanced and transformed civil service expertise and new competencies 
                                                          
2 The term good governance has been introduced in the 1989 World Bank Report on sub-Saharan 
Africa. In this report the central elements of the enabling state concept can be found. 
3 These traditional tasks often termed classical involving internal and external law, safety and 
order tasks. These are part of this enabling role 
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suited to that new role. Linked to this new civil service proficiency, civil servant auton-
omy had to grow as well. This pertains to a professional autonomy within the confines 
of an impartial discharge of affairs within the confines of a democratic Rechtsstaat 4 
and bound by considerations of a political-administrative nature and an apprehension 
of societal cares and concerns (Van der Meer, Van den Berg & Dijkstra 2012). In short, 
as a direct result, the role of civil service would have grown in importance and influ-
ence (Van der Meer, Raadschelders & Toonen 2015).  
On the other hand and perhaps a bit paradoxically, a countertrend has become visible 
in recent years threatening the very position of the civil service in government in a 
fundamental way. This involves a potential loss of its substantive professionalism and 
the degree of assigned autonomy that was and is considered essential both in profes-
sional and academic circles. The origins of this countertrend are rooted in exactly the 
same advancement of the enabling state and the changing MLG system. First, the rise 
of the enabling state has coincided with and has been reinforced by an intensified and 
ever increasing popularity of an output orientation in measuring government perfor-
mance Page & Wright 2007; Van der Meer 2009; 2012). That concentration on perfor-
mance management has been the outcome of the dominance in the public sector of 
new public management approaches since the 1980s. Secondly, an intensifying degree 
of political administrative risk avoidance has likewise produced negative consequenc-
es. Related to the risk avoidance argument we will also want to point to an anti-
bureaucratic sentiment that has always been noticeable in the past but that has be-
come stronger since the 1980s and more recently almost the dominant orthodoxy. That 
anti-bureaucratic sentiment was and still is in some quarters a powerful vehicle in the 
                                                          
4 Approximately equal and to equated to a state conveying and embodying the rule of law. 
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battle against big government. Without delving too much in this subject matter, a 
strong wish in politics, segments of the media and also society did develop in order to 
control government and in particular bureaucracy. Measures aimed at reducing its size 
and costs and also to limit its presumed power over political decision making were in-
troduced with the objective to erode its monopoly on expertise and advice.  Finally 
from a societal point of view the objective was rolling back its perceived grip on society 
seen as a threat to individual liberty and citizens’ self-determination. The latter was 
reinforced by some quarters in politics in an attempt to isolate itself from society and 
the media criticism as a part of the public sector blame game., 
In short, these developments are seen to strain and impose more and severe limita-
tions on an independent and impartial civil service system input in policymaking and 
service delivery. As a consequence, the thought has emerged as formulated in our in-
troduction that the available leeway and margin within the civil service system for ar-
ticulating professional opinions through loyal contradiction, including appraisal and ex 
ante voice towards the political- administrative leadership and co-workers have been 
reduced. This core civil service task is thus supposed to have come under pressure and 
from a time perspective declined in modern government. As a result a new more com-
pliant ‘can do civil servant has been in the making or returned to the field:  a servant in 
the more negative meaning of the word 9Van der Meer, Dijkstra 7 Van den Berg 2012). 
As will be elaborated below voice has to be understood within the context of this paper 
only ex post but primarily ex ante. In the next paragraph we will examine this issue 
more in detail and will also look into the possible explanations and if and when rele-
vant possible ways out.  
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Loyal contradiction, appraisal and voice 
The preferred and actual role, tasks and functioning of (senior) civil servants within 
the decision-making process and regarding public service delivery have been core is-
sues in administrative sciences and practioners in the public sector since the end of the 
19th century (Self 1972: Raadschelders 1998, Van der Meer & Kerkhoff 2016; Van der 
Meer, Dijkstra & Kerkhoff 2016). Based on these analyses, this observation of the cru-
cial role played and to be played by civil servants had also a profound effect on the 
content and form of the relevant curricula both in pre- and post-entry education and 
training programs. This development holds true for almost all countries though the 
exact content and institutional form of education may differ according to the system of 
state5 (Kickert 2011, etc.). In relation, issues of, loyal contradiction, appraisal and voice 
have been essential topics in classical studies and texts of public administration and 
political science literature when discussing the position and attitude of bureaucracy in 
political-administrative relationships; see for instance Peters Self’s Administrative the-
ory and politics: An Enquiry into the Structure and Processes of Modern Government 
(1972). It has mostly been associated in political science and public administration aca-
demic work with in particular the Westminster model and to an extent an informed 
reading of the Weberian approach to bureaucracy and politics (Page 1985). But this 
perspective is too ‘European’ centred given its occurrence in many so-called non-
western systems. 
                                                          
5 We refer to differences and variations in state systems and design though the variation in 
classifying these systems of state (see Kickert 2011, Kuhlmann & Wohlmann 2014, Bouckaert & 
Kuhlmann 2016 and Painter & Peters 2010 is rather extensive and unsatisfactory (see for criti-
cism of these classifications Van der Meer, Raadschelders & Toonen 2008). 
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Terms as loyal contradiction, appraisal and voice are in need of some further explana-
tions as their exact meanings are not self-evident. They even might seem to be contra-
dictory. When using the word ‘voice’ the work and approach of Albert Hirschman 
‘Voice, Exit and loyalty’ springs to mind (1970). It revolves around an action that can be 
taken in the form of an opinion that is expressed –here in case of a bureaucratic con-
text- in case of an unsatisfactory situation, idea or proposed course of action. A person 
of groups of actors or even an organization can express their opinions in order to alle-
viate or mend that negative situation. Alternatively, he or she (etc.) can exit the organ-
ization or withdrawal. Or finally stay and keep silent from a perspective of loyalty. The 
voice option can imply whistle-blowing.6 For our purpose we have to adapt these con-
cepts. Here we already want to mention that voice in the context of this paper the em-
phasis is on ex ante voice instead of the ex post voice of Hirschman.  We will return to 
ex ante voice below. 
The term ' loyalty ' as used in this paper also needs further explanation. In general us-
age, the term loyalty has a positive overtone. A crucial question that does arise in this 
context relates to the concern loyal(ty) to whom? To use a now less burdened histori-
cal example, this particular problem became manifest at the FBI during the time of the 
Watergate scandal. FBI employees had to swear an oath (or promise/affirm loyalty) to 
the Constitution, to serve in the (general) interest in accordance with the rule of law 
and in service to democratic values and therefore expressly not solely to the president 
himself. This is the core of ‘All the Presidential Men’ written by Bernstein and Wood-
                                                          
6
 Interesting enough to well into the modern times (the tradition ending in the 18th century, the 
jester was the only person at court who could speak the truth to the master/royal with impuni-
ty. Nowadays mainly seen as a clown he also had in mediaeval times the task to hold a mirror 
to the master of the day. 
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ward in 1974 and sequent Pakula 1976 movie. More recent examples from the United 
States are also abundant for instance regarding to the Comey issue during the election 
and his testimony regarding the o relations between Russia and the Trump entourage 
during the 2016 presidential elections and previous to the presidential inauguration of 
Donald Trump. The term ' contradiction ‘on the other hand has to a certain degree a 
rather negative connotation. From its particular meaning and use within the context 
this paper with the addition of the adjective ‘loyal’ it becomes clear that this term can 
be considered rather in a more positive than in a negative way; hence the adjective 
‘loyal’. In regular usage, contradiction can seem to convey the view that the officer or 
official inappropriately contravenes the expressed and legitimate view and will of polit-
ical and bureaucratic officials higher in the hierarchy. From the example in the case of 
Watergate it should be clear that absolute loyalty should not always be seen in a posi-
tive light.  After all the views and the actions of the political and administrative execu-
tive can be in conflict with the public interest and even with constitutional values as 
has been the case in the Watergate affair.  The same applies even more strongly in ab-
solute loyalty in authoritarian settings as can be learned from the Friedrich- Finer de-
bate on the nature of administrative responsiveness and accountability with its over-
tures to the failing role of bureaucracy in World War 2 dictatorships is also pointing to 
these issues See also the insights of Von Borch (1954) and E.N. Peterson (1966) on bu-
reaucracy in the Nazi era. Returning to our main argument, looking at it from this line 
of reasoning contradiction strongly becomes to resemble voice again. Voice will be ex-
amined below more in detail below.  
The use of voice in this paper is, as said, what different from the Hirschman approach 
in the sense that it has a much more extensive connotation. Here, voice is understood 
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as being a central core responsibility of a public official in order to offer alternative, 
counter and even dissenting arguments or raise possible difficult and awkward ques-
tions in order to sharpen and improve a certain policy position, an implementation 
practise or any other course of action proposed by the (political) leadership and col-
leagues. By formulating possible question marks and looking for alternative courses of 
action, a mirror is shown to the person with a (not necessarily end) responsibility for 
the part of decision making. The primary objective is to improve the quality of that 
course of action. In addition from an (organizational) political point of view it also in-
volves the issue of (political) survival. The qualification ‘improved’ refers to certain 
desired standards and wishes of the decision maker but it also refers to improve in 
terms of the general (public) interest. So it is not solely an ex post phenomenon as in 
the case of how voice customary is understood but also and even predominantly an ex 
ante duty. Regarding the issue of the final responsibility this phrasing is perhaps a little 
bit cryptically. Advice remains only advice and leaves in end the final say to the deci-
sion maker perhaps better informed and more able to take the decisions, in the seat of 
power.  
Having said this, we do encounter an important fundamental difficulty; even when we 
keep the point of the final responsibility division in perspective. What are the sources 
of and the legitimization of civil servants providing these counter arguments and opin-
ions? Do they spring from personal held convictions and beliefs?  Can they be traced to 
a more ‘objective’ civil servants’ professionalism with all its varied content depending 
on the type of bureaucracy and the state system, model and its culture and traditions. 
Or do they belong to the existing set and repertoire of organizational convictions, 
opinions and interests? We will not delve too deep and too far into this particular sub-
14 
 
ject matter but it is however important to take this point in account as it leads to dis-
cussions on the legitimacy of the role and function of the civil service system. In its 
slipstream discussions on politicization and representative bureaucracy as control 
mechanism in case of a negative apprehension of the dominant sources of civil service 
opinions become relevant.  As a consequence, the institutional design parameters 
greatly influence the leeway for loyal contradiction, appraisal and ex ante voice. 
This idea of ex ante voice as defined above is closely associated with the concept of 
appraisal. Appraisal is understood to involve the weighing and giving advice on policy 
alternatives by civil servants towards (a) political officeholder(s). It also contains the 
element of (loyal contradiction as described above.The adjective ‘classical’ (as used 
earlier in this section) might sound as a euphemistically worded alternative adjective 
for old-fashioned and outdated. In effect, in modern public management literature the 
movement from policy advice including appraisal to management as a core activity has 
be argued rather convincingly albeit on a normative and/or prescriptive level. For in-
stance, the demise of the Westminster model during and in the aftermath of the Mar-
garet Thatcher era has been identified as a well-established fact; though the disconti-
nuity to be seen in empirical work is less manifest and clear-cut as recent research 
shows (Page 2010; see also the Governance issue on the Westminster model volume 29, 
Issue 4 October 2016). Discontinuity and rupture is given their sensationalist nature 
often more interesting to the ambitious opinion maker and aspiring academics conti-
nuity. Regardless what the exact level of continuity during the last decades has been, 
there is ample evidence that the managerial position of public officials in the political-
administrative systems of many Western industrialized states is argued to have be-
come more important (Van der Meer, Raadschelders & Toonen 2015). Factors behind 
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these developments have to do with the profound changes in the nature of the system 
of public governance as described above.  
To continue with our discussion of appraisal in the context of loyal contradiction, this 
civil service tasks to provide counter arguments, a wider perspective and even a possi-
ble level of contradiction has been, as said, at the core of bureaucracy since the early 
beginning all over Europe. When focusing on Northwestern and Central Europe, be it 
countries with a Germanic Rechtsstaat tradition or a British style Westminster model, 
a neutral and impartial civil service did develop during the course of the 19th century 
(Raadschelders & Rutgers 1996). Both the Weberian bureaucracy and the Anglo-Saxon 
public interest models considered an appraisal role for civil servants as essential. The 
development of an impartial, neutral bureaucracy based on the rule of law and staffed 
by official with the characteristics of the Bureaukratische Verwaltungsstab described 
by Weber in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft was a crucial precondition for the develop-
ment of this core responsibility. Even the iron chancellor Otto von Bismarck did de-
mand open and communicative role and attitude of his closest staff was demanded. 
Crucial, however and we will return to this as one of the possible factors explaining the 
increasing difficulty with this civil service requirement and role is that it should be dis-
charged in privacy and the closed confines of ministerial and civil service discussions. 
It is important to mention that appraisal and loyal contradiction through internal voice 
– are something quite different from whistle blowers activities that are not only limited 
to political office holders and the immediate staff, but also to all line interaction within 
bureaucracy and horizontally between colleagues. It is thus more intricate than a mere 
interaction issue between the political officeholders and the top bureaucrats. 
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The level to what extent voice and appraisal has disappeared is still somewhat in the 
open as for instance see above the notion of presumed demise of the Whitehall model 
has been criticized.  But conceptualizing appraisal merely in policy advisory tasks is 
too limited. Appraisal is only one part of the picture. It goes much farther and is not 
only confined to the grand circles of political-administrative relations. Voice also in-
volves the matter of loyal contradiction. These words of loyal contradiction might 
sound a little bit puzzling. The basic idea is that in order to be effective as a good civil 
servant and also as a good ‘servant’ to the political master of the day, the civil service 
leadership, the immediate colleagues and/or the public, staff members have to (be able 
to) give their honest and frank opinion on policy and other organizational issues in 
order to let leadership get to know positive and/or negative (side) effects of a certain 
course of action.  From the same perspective, it is essential to show the leadership both 
administrative and political pitfalls on the shorter and longer run.  
At the same time, there are difficulties regarding the manifold forms of appearance of 
that deficiency or decline of expressing voice. These difficulties not only pertain to civil 
servants not being allowed to express their honest opinion and concerns, but might 
also has involve what we can name as the Pirovitch complex that they might refrain 
from it for a variety of reasons being scared or not disposed to these activities7 . In ad-
dition and even more interesting they might be not able to express the opinions by 
lack of expertise, experience and political-administrative skills. Why that might be the 
case will be explained more in detail below. In addition, restrictions to loyal contradic-
tion do not only pertain to and manifest it in the relationships between top civil serv-
                                                          
7 Pirovitch was a clerk in the movie shop around the corner who when ever the own-
er/manager Mr, Matuschek would ask his staff for an honest opinion fled out of side afraid to 
upset his boss fearing to meet his displeasure and the dire consequences. 
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ants and political officeholders though most attention in political administrative sci-
ence and public administration literature is directed at this particular relationship. It is 
also relevant a perhaps even more to relationships within bureaucracy itself. This in-
volves both loyal contradiction and voice in vertical or hierarchical chain relationships 
but also in horizontal perspective between colleagues. We will discuss this triple divi-
sion below. 
To what extent has this scope for loyal contradiction decreased from a historical per-
spective? Without the availability of abundant empirical material, this question might 
seem rather hard to answer. There is a tendency to exaggerate or embellish the situa-
tion in an often-imaginary past as it is quite useful to contrast that golden age to cur-
rent everyday life befitted with existing problems and undesirable situations. This 
mechanism is quite ubiquitous in many fields of life but also present in some less in-
formed, ahistorical studies of government when at random history is invoked. For in-
stance it has become quite customary to compare normative ideas and perceptions 
regarding the role and place of bureaucracy within the system of government and in 
the policy making process and the provision of public service delivery in years gone by 
with the empirical situation of present-day. An example of this can be found in the 
changing nature of political administrative relations over time relevant to our topic 
where a shift from a formal-legal towards more fusion or even administrative state 
models (to mix the Peters 1988 and the Aberbach, Putman and Rockham 1981 ap-
proaches) is presumed. Apart from the fact that the formal legal model is in curious 
way equated to the Weberian ideal type of bureaucracy (Weber 1926; see Page 1985) 
the normative and primarily normative legal and constitutional dimensions behind 
this formal legal model are discarded and exchanged for an empirical notion. When 
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the dominant approach in studying changed from a constitutional legal to a political 
science approach also the associated perspective changed. This would have led to a 
misreading of results regarding presumed transformations (see also Rosenthal 1979; 
1983). Things might have changed over the years but these conclusions are not found-
ed on available empirical research and evidence. Then again, we have to say that avail-
able empirical evidence in administrative historical research is scanty given the re-
search direction in administrative history. Some material is found in rather fragmen-
tary and idiosyncratic administrative history studies where often attention is concen-
trated on attention-grabbing and prominent issues that might not be necessarily the 
regular state of affairs. Nevertheless, well reported and documented political-
administrative crises in many countries point to a rise of incidents involving a reduc-
tion in the leeway for loyal contradiction and externa voice. Additional examples are 
provided in the next paragraph. 
 
Explanations for (a decline) in the scope for loyal contradiction including appraisal 
through voice in civil service systems 
In the previous paragraphs, we have introduced and discussed questions relating to a 
(declining) scope for loyal contradiction towards the political administrative leader-
ship and colleagues within civil service systems on a conceptual level. In order to ad-
dress these issues more fully and find explanations for why that scope might be limited 
and has potentially declined, we will have to look into the nature and causes of this 
limitation to the opinion articulation. How this scope for expressing these opinions is 
shaped, depends on a variation in different settings. We will discuss the relevant fac-
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tors that are either conducive or limiting to that scope. For addressing these issues, we 
will first introduce a three-way subdivision of types of relationships as the relevant ex-
planatory factors might differ according each of the following three8: 
1. The relationship and direction of interaction between top and senior civil serv-
ants on the one hand and political officeholders and political representatives at 
relevant levels of government on the other. 
2. Internal hierarchical relationships within bureaucracy itself:  between leaders 
and subordinates at all levels of the hierarchical chain. 
3. Horizontal relationships between colleagues at an equal hierarchical level with-
in the organization. 
As argued in the previous paragraph we also have to keep in mind a following triple 
division regarding the issue how opinion articulation might be hindered types as appli-
cable explanatory factors might differ according to the relevance of nature and source 
of the limitation to the opinion articulation: 
a. Limitations regarding voice pertaining to civil servants not being allowed to ex-
press their honest opinion and concerns, but it might also has involve  
b. The Pirovitch complex involving civil servants might refrain from it for a variety 
of reasons being scared or not disposed to these activities.  
c. Civil servants not being able to express these kinds of opinions by lack of exper-
tise, experience and political-administrative skills.  
                                                          
8 A fourth and from the angle of this paper rather intriguing dimension would involve the rela-
tionship between bureaucracy and the private public domain: civil society, citizens etc. It is 
stretching our discussion a bit too much given also limitations of space in this paper, but it has 
bearings on the other dimensions. 
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On basis of these classifications we can develop the following grid on direction of rela-
tionships and nature of inhibitions against appraisal and loyal contradiction for use in 
empirical studies. 
Figure 1: different types of relationships forms and the nature and source of the limita-
tion to the opinion articulation 
Limitations/relationships 1 2 3 
a    
b    
c    
 
We will start with examining the obstacles civil servants can experience when wishing 
to articulate their professional opinions through voice, appraisal and loyal contradic-
tion towards top civil servants, political officeholders and other political representa-
tives at various levels of government. These difficulties, as said, can pertain to the situ-
ation that civil servants are not being allowed to express their free and unrestricted 
opinions and concerns. As a first possible explanation, we can point to the particular 
character, disposition and behavioural treats of the political leadership of the day. This 
might be less attractive to social scientist than to historians given the idiosyncratic 
method of explaining.  Nevertheless personalist aspects should not be overlooked.  In 
addition, the effects of a general societal decline of a routine acceptance of political 
authority of the officeholder might induce an increase in their uncertainty towards and 
lack of confidence in bureaucratic officials. Political survival will be discussed below, 
but associate with survival is an inclination to personal and political face saving. Rather 
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incorrectly, face-saving is a phenomenon often considered of less importance in a 
western cultural setting characterized by a-personalist (personal and) organizational 
culture.9 That a-personalist culture if it ever did exist in degree supposed is certainly 
on the retreat given image protection and (social) media influences. The wish for per-
sonal face- saving is thus one of the relevant explanations. Furthermore, the popular 
notion of dominating bureaucratic power might also lead to an antibureaucratic atti-
tude and fear by politicians. From the 1970s onward there is empirical evidence in 
many countries of the rise of such distrust (Raadschelders & Van der Meer 1999). 
Though it is on first impression rather amusing, the anti-bureaucratic sentiment in the 
popular BBC sitcom Yes Minister is telling.10 Often political-administrative sensitivity 
is considered an essential attribute for (senior) civil servants. This implies these (high 
ranking) civil servants should know and realize the importance of political (not neces-
sarily the party political) dimensions of working for and in government. Likewise polit-
ical office holders should have an administrative or bureaucratic sensitivity; knowing 
these dimensions of the business of government. The level to which political office-
holders do possess this ability may differ according to: 
a. Again, the personality of the political officeholder; 
b. The nature (both in structural and cultural of the political administrative sys-
tem; 
c. In connection with that the level and form of politicization 
                                                          
9
 Avoiding this cliché we see that our line of reasoning regarding our research question is per-
taining to a wider set of state systems in East and West. 
10 Interesting enough one of the writers was an adept and fan of Margaret Thatcher one of the 
leading politician distrustful of bureaucratic power and voice; in fact distrustful of any other 
competing view within her cabinet and government. Perhaps a bit apocryphal the story runs 
that Margaret Thatcher when prime minister remarked any other opinion is allowed as long it 
is mine. 
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d. The model of state the political-administrative system is part of. 
 
Apart from the personal traits and the institutional design elements discussed above 
there is also other factors influencing the ‘allowableness’ , space and permissibility for 
giving voice, appraisal and expressing words of loyal contradiction.  First, we have to 
direct attention towards a (n increasing) short term orientation of political officehold-
ers as an explanatory factor. In classical PA and political science literature the different 
time frames of politicians and civil servants are using, have been seen as causing major 
differences in attitude and task related motivation. Elections with their specific time 
frames and the in principle appointment for life of civil servants were provided as one 
of the reasons. The validity of this argument is of course depending on having a party 
political neutral and above all permanent (senior) civil service. This is an important 
caveat as the permanency of the civil service and of the appointment to top civil serv-
ant positions is deeply rooted in a Weberian or Westminster style neutral civil service.  
Nevertheless empirical evidence tends to show, that perhaps with the exception of the 
most politicized spoils and ministerial cabinet systems and managerial systems utiliz-
ing predominantly flexible and short term appointments that difference in timing be-
tween political office holders and administrative officials is still visible.11 Having said 
this, given this increasing orientation on short term results and performance the limi-
tation on loyal contradiction and appraisal through ex ante voice can become quite 
understandable. Media scrutiny of ministerial performance and crises do force political 
officeholders to concentrate on getting these direct results and showing an impressive 
                                                          
11 The vault lines between politics and administration in the highly politicized systems is of 
course visible at a lower hierarchical level where the same discrepancy becomes visible. 
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performance record. In addition, a similar media focus on political party action and 
performance in combination with an intensifying parliamentary (formal) scrutiny of 
the executive is driving political officeholders in the same direction. Likewise, also so-
cietal pressure is pushing political officeholders in a similar direction to go for quick 
action and results. The interconnected nature of all these fore-mentioned develop-
ments is rather conducive for an emphasis on a short term orientation. In short from 
this political orientation is quite understandable that loyal contradiction could easily 
be seen as an unnecessary and unwelcome obstacle hindering direct action that has to 
be avoided at all costs and all instances. What has been said here equally applies to the 
bureaucratic leadership in relation to its immediate staff. Also they have to deliver and 
they can use the cloak of political authority as they are being positioned closer to the 
ear, mind and heart of the political officeholders. 
Above we have referred to the so-called Pirovitch complex that civil servants might 
refrain from voice, appraisal and loyal contradiction for a variety of reasons being 
scared or not disposed to these activities. This is quite interesting because it seems to 
be much closer to the classical and many thought redundant and old fashioned idea of 
the bureaucratic personality. Bureaucrats would be to say the least not the most of en-
trepreneurial and outspoken of all types of employees. Not working for a commercial 
business that has to survive the entrapping of the market mechanism, he or she is per-
forming in the role of a servant to a political officeholder and whose wishes and ideas 
are considered paramount. This subservient position towards the political officehold-
ers finds its origins in the supposed authority, relationships and the legitimacy of 
his/her position in vested in that official given an ‘anointment’ by the public and/or a 
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supreme12 being all would be shaping this bureaucratic personality. The concept of 
public servant is used here with an emphasis on servant with the connotation of sub-
missive attitude. That negative stereotype is contrasted at all most the same time with 
the idea of an all-powerful servant using/appropriating his master’s and society’s pow-
ers. Interestingly enough the idea of a proactive, empowered, professional, entrepre-
neurial civil servant operating rather autonomously and independent in his/her net-
work setting  in an emerging multilevel governance system looks more closer to the 
concept than the former formulation but yet…  
Being pro-active etc. does not mean necessarily (when confronted with the necessity) 
to speak out to the political leadership or a higher authority in the bureaucratic chain 
that one will do so. Perhaps a more illuminating notion and observation might be that 
civil servants more in the direct surroundings of the political officeholders are under 
more direct scrutiny and vulnerable to political intervention and reprisals. Civil servant 
working at a greater distance from politics and the core department for instance in 
implementation offices and agencies might enjoy a larger degree of autonomy; at least 
where the leadership of those offices is concerned. With the decentralization of man-
agement responsibilities and the loosening of central control under the introduction of 
new public management the possibility of creating empires under the sun with an au-
tonomous and even autocratic leadership has increased. Mentioning new public man-
agement with its accent on output orientation, we return again to the emphasis on 
short term results and as a consequence limitations being put on voice, appraisal and 
loyal contradiction. Returning to the position and attitude of top civil servants we have 
                                                          
12 See quite interesting the Dutch formula for royal orders by grace of God etc. dating to divine 
sources of royal power. 
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remarked that civil servants more in the direct surroundings of the political officehold-
ers are under more direct scrutiny and vulnerable to political intervention and repris-
als and a preferred behaviour as conforming courtiers is stimulated. There is an expres-
sion in Dutch that is fitting and could be translated in English as: cowardice is clothed 
in royal fur13 meaning that contrary to expectations free minded conversation at the 
top level is rarely seen thus stimulating group think and the possibility on the longer 
or shorter run of a political crisis. This is perhaps too negative a portrayal of reality. 
Situations might differ and also here the personality aspect is important. Nevertheless 
with the arrival of more managerial inclined civil servants also according to some 
sources less independent top civil servants have arrive to the political administrative 
scene.  In addition to the arguments given above, we have also to mention the effects 
of politicization of a system in this respect. In particular we have to look at the number 
and role of political appointees, members of ministerial cabinets and other politicized 
support structures. To a varying degree according the pertinent political administrative 
system design they can function as a blockage between the political officeholders and 
bureaucracy. At the same time a high degree of political loyalty might diminish the 
extent of loyal contradiction. 
Last but not least, we have to point to the third case when civil servants not being able 
to express the opinions by lack of expertise, experience and political-administrative 
skills. The explanation stems from the effects of new public management (NPM) and 
the rise of the enabling state. Through privatisation, agentification and other NPM like 
reforms, implementation and the practical field knowledge has diminished or even 
                                                          
13
 Lafheid gaat gekleed in hermelijn. Hermelijn is ermine; the traditional fur for the robes of 
royals. 
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disappeared. In addition cutbacks on staff may have negative effects on available civil 
service expertise (Van der Meer 2012).  
We will expand on this line of reasoning by pointing to recent evidence in the Nether-
lands and other Western countries. As direct consequence of the introduction of NPM 
in Netherlands (and in many other countries) parts of the administration (in the cen-
tral government: the ministries) have been hived off though agentification or (partial) 
privatization. 14This hiving off mainly relates to the implementation of policies and the 
direct delivery of public services. As a consequence knowledge and expertise relating to 
policy implementation at the various policy directorates has virtually disappeared or at 
least was seriously reduced. Often so-called organizational interface structures were 
created to alleviate a hard split between policy making and delivery units. These inter-
face relationships and monitoring of service delivery outputs could hardly tackle these 
deficiencies. Less information and understanding of field and implementation issues 
automatically also implies less information that can be used in order to support voice 
and loyal contradiction. Not only the actual implementation and service delivery ser-
vices but also the supervisory inspection functions were organizationally located at 
arm length of core governmental and bureaucratic organizations. As a consequence 
the information deficit in the core bureaucratic organizations did increase and accord-
ingly the capacity for voice and loyal contradiction.   
Another aspect of NPM producing an effect in the same direction has been caused by 
the mobility schemes within government. In order to combat organizational compart-
mentalization the idea is that senior but also lower ranking officials should not be too 
                                                          
14
 Partial privatization points of production privatization though contracting out through 
mainly public tendering whereas provision decisions by and large remain public. 
27 
 
long staying in a specific job at a particular place. Instead they should leave after a 
couple of years and have to rotate between different organizations by changing func-
tions.  For among others these reasons, a Senior Public Service (in Dutch Algemene 
Bestuursdienst or ABD) was introduced (Raadschelders & Van der Meer 1999; 2014; 
Van der Meer & Dijkstra 2012; Van der Meer, Dijkstra & Kerkhoff 2016). This increased 
horizontal mobility was combined with the idea that a top official had to be an effec-
tive and efficient manager and not necessarily a top specialist in the particular policy 
domain (s) he is working or a having a generalist policy advisory knowledge.  In addi-
tion this increased mobility would enhance political control over the top civil service 
and limit their service monopoly. Because of this development, loyal contradiction and 
voicing professional opinions was limited in a twofold way. First this could entail that 
senior civil servants could possess limited knowledge with respect to the organization-
al domain they were appointed and, secondly, that their bond with and knowledge of 
the organization and the attached policy area official service to which they were as-
signed could also be limited in nature.  
To use the Dutch tax service as an example that recently triggered a wide public and 
political debate did revolve around major delivery problems at that organization. 
These problems led to the premature resignation of a secretary of state (staatssecreta-
ris) and some of senior civil servants working at this directorate-general. According to 
an official investigation report a major cause situated behind these organizational 
problems was a lack of scope for (loyal) contradiction and voice. This lack of room for 
loyal contradiction and voice was largely explained not primarily by the personal ap-
proach and management style but mainly by an insufficient organizational working 
knowledge of senior civil servants in charge of the Tax Office and the large organiza-
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tional distance between the leadership of the Tax Office, the political executive and the 
rank and file of the organization. This was enhanced by a closed organizational culture 
at the top. This is only one of many examples. 
Another relevant aspect of NPM from the perspective and objective of this paper has 
been the introduction of performance management. Employees in the public sector 
need to have a regular performance assessment. Much can be argued for such an as-
sessment be it that can only reasonably be done in quantifiable terms. The latter is ra-
ther problematic in case of this chore/duty of loyal contradiction and voice. The result 
has been that loyal contradiction within public organizations remains not only unre-
warded, but it is often also implicitly or even explicitly discouraged. Finally, as a result 
of NPM in the wake of retrenchment policies from the 1980s, many cuts have been 
made to the public service; particularly reducing staffing levels and investment in 
training budgets. These budget cuts have thus meant that the bureaucracy came even 
further under pressure and that important expertise diminished or even (largely) dis-
appeared. Once again, this meant that the required expertise for voice and (loyal) con-
tradiction was reduced.  
Finally, what is very important with respect to voice and appraisal being heard is that 
those expressions have to be made behind closed doors as openness can a negative ef-
fect on the sender and the willingness of receiver to listen. Currently in many coun-
tries, a new wave of initiatives has been and is developed directed at more government 
transparency through open government initiatives.  Many countries (including at least 
the countries belonging to the European Union) have such laws. It has become almost 
a test for decent government and a hallmark for good governance in recent years. The 
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trend over the past few decades is thus clear, more and more public sector documents 
should be made public. Of course this has important benefits to democratic govern-
ance and also to a more resp0nsive service delivery. A democratic rule of law benefits 
from openness. But there are also ample drawbacks. The concept of ' documents ' that 
have to made actively public is increasingly extended among other things (in the 
Dutch case at least) also to emails. The result may be that within the civil service more 
and more officials refrain from voicing their professional opinions, on paper, in a digi-
tal form or by e-mail. The same applies to the potential receivers of these messages. 
After all, these views can easily reach the media whether or not after legal intervention. 
Of course, contradiction in an oral form is always still possible, but it must be clear 
that from the point of view of the organisation of contradiction this legislation also 
negative aspects giving its fleeting and ephemeral nature.  
In conclusion to this transparency issue, civil servants expressing their particular opin-
ions in the open when those views are contrary of those of the political officeholders 
have always been dealt with in a resolute way given the negative external effects for the 
political officeholders in the media,  society and other political quarters. Thus legisla-
tion directed at introducing almost an absolute degree of  transparency in government 
decision-making – particular in the phases before an official document is issued - 
would be detrimental to civil service voice, appraisal and loyal contradiction as that 
voice etc. will not be send or received given again those external political, media and 
societal effects. Civil servant will then become more careful to express their honest 
opinion and political officeholders to ask or accept it. Paradoxically, overemphasizing 
transparency will diminish attempts to enhance the quality of public service delivery 
and decision making. 
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Summary and conclusions 
In this paper, we have examined the issue to what extent and how the expressing of 
voice by officials within government and civil service systems has become more prob-
lematic and which explanations can help us to understand this phenomenon. The cen-
tral questions in this paper have been formulated as: what is the scope for loyal con-
tradiction (including appraisal) through ex ante voice towards the political and organi-
zational leadership of and colleagues within civil service systems? What can explain 
potential problems obstructing the expression of these professional opinions? Finally, 
has a change occurred in terms of a decline of space available when comparing the pre-
sent situation to the recent past and what can help us to explain such a possible trend?  
At the beginning of our discussion, we have argued that though this feeling of a dimin-
ishing scope has increased nevertheless a comprehensive empirical overview and a 
deeper theoretical background to this issue is absent. Making a contribution to fil that 
gap has been the prime aim of this paper.  
A first conclusion we want to make is more of a terminological nature. The concept of ' 
loyal contradiction ' is central to this paper. Often, but not always, this idea of  loyal 
contradiction and voice as a civil service function might be deemed quite negatively by 
political and administrative executives. It is then seen as a negative phenomenon in 
the sense of civil service resistance or even worse opposition. The popular British com-
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edy series Yes (prime) minister revolved around this idea.15 In fact, political bureaucra-
cy bashing is finding its origins in this negative conviction. From what has been said in 
this this paper it has become clear that to loyal contradiction and voice a positive 
meaning can be attached. The examples presented here with regard to the space shut-
tles Challenger and Columbia the absence of a clear scope for loyal contradiction has 
shown the negative effects. But examples are abundant. Speaking of ' contradiction ‘we 
have entered a discussion on the exact meaning of the concepts exit, voice and loyalty 
as introduced by Hirschman and given our objectives the somewhat different meaning 
and use in this paper. Loyal contradiction through voice that is central to this paper is 
mostly internal in nature, while the use of the term voice by Hirschman in particular 
refers to a demand for attention externally. In addition, loyal contradiction as used in 
this paper focusses on the expression of the professional opinion of civil servants ex 
ante (before the decision is made), while in Hirschman writing it is mainly afterwards 
(ex post). Regarding the concept of ' loyalty ' we have some question marks. Loyalty to 
whom?  To your supervisor, the Member of Government or to the ' general interest '. 
Though well-known these questions are a remainder of the importance of concept def-
initions in this debate, 
Though in the enabling framework state operating in a MLG context the need for more 
civil service autonomy bound by the rule of law and a linking-pin position between 
government, politics and society through a public service attitude has increased a 
counter trend more directed a limiting and controlling that civil service (sys-
tem)position and autonomy has become visible. As argued in our paper, the growing 
                                                          
15
 One of its writers was an ardent supporter of Margaret Thatcher who is said to have selected 
so-called can do civil servants and is said to have stated (perhaps apocryphal) that all opinions 
ae welcomes as long these are mine. 
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dominance of performance management coinciding with a growing popularity of out-
put orientation with as dominant values a business like conception of efficiency and 
effectiveness has left process values as democracy/responsiveness and the rule of law in 
second place. That focus on performance management, output orientation and to use 
Hood (1991) categorization sigma values has been the result of new public manage-
ment becoming the dominant approach (es) to public management in government 
stimulate by international organizations as the OECD and not to forget academia for a 
while since the 1980s. Secondly, an increased level of political administrative risk 
avoidance equally has equally produced negative effects. Tied to this risk avoidance 
there has also been a rise in a political craving for controlling bureaucracy and reduce 
its assumed monopoly on expertise and advice by creating and using alternative 
sources (Peters & Pierre 1999). This leads to the conclusion that the opportunity and 
available room for articulating voice including a commitment to appraisal and loyal 
contradiction towards the (political) leadership and colleagues has lessened.   
The concept of voice as used in this paper is much wider than in the well-known con-
ceptualization of Hirschman. It includes providing counter arguments or raise difficult 
question in order to sharpen a policy, an implementation practise or any other course 
of action. By formulating question marks and looking for alternative courses of action a 
mirror is shown tot the decision making with the idea that that course of action can be 
improved. Improved according to the standards and wishes of the decision maker but 
also improved in the general interest. The basic idea is that in order to be operating as 
a good civil servant and also as a good employee of the political master or the civil ser-
vice leadership or the immediate colleagues staff members have to give their honest 
and frank opinion on policy and other organizational issues in order to let leadership 
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get to know positive and/or negative (side) effects of a certain course of action. Also it 
is important to show the leadership both administrative and political pitfalls on the 
shorter and longer run. In addition,  limitations to loyal contradiction and appraisal 
through ex ante voice do not only pertain to and is manifest in the relationships be-
tween top civil servants though most attention concentrates to it in political adminis-
trative science and public administration literature but also is relevant perhaps in some 
cases even more to internal relationships within bureaucracy itself.  
We have introduced a triple division as the explanatory factor might differ according 
each of these dimensions the relationships between top civil servants and political of-
ficeholders and political representatives, internal hierarchical relationships within bu-
reaucracy between leaders and subordinates at all levels in the hierarchical chain and 
horizontal relationships between colleagues on an equal level. We also remarked, that 
a fourth and from the angle of this paper rather intriguing dimension can be distin-
guished involving the relationship between bureaucracy and the private public do-
main: civil society, citizens etc. It is stretching our discussion a bit too much given also 
limitations of space in this paper, but it has bearings on the other dimension. As ar-
gued in our paper we have to keep the three types of relationships  in consideration as 
the explanatory factors show also variation with respect to voice limitationss pertain-
ing to civil servants not being allowed to express their honest opinion and concerns, 
but might also has involve the Pirovitch complex that they might refrain from it for a 
variety of reasons being scared or not disposed to these activities and finally civil serv-
ants not being able to express the opinions by lack of expertise, experience and politi-
cal-administrative skills.  
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As said extremely important with respect to voice and appraisal being heard is that 
those expressions are made behind closed doors as openness has a negative effect on 
the sender and the receiver. Civil servant might become more cautious to give their 
views and political officeholders might be more refraining from asking or accepting it. 
Thus this overemphasis on transparency will diminish any attempt to enhance the 
quality of public service delivery and decision making. 
Finally, as loyal contradiction is essential for maintaining organizational performance 
and legitimacy, a declining scope will in the end be self-defeating to management and 
politics alike. By looking into the mechanisms that determines (stimulates and limits) 
this scope for loyal contradiction in organizations through voice we might also provide 
insights how to guarantee this, what we consider, essential civil service function and 
obligation. 
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